Fourth, these proposals should be assessed in terms of how they address a central challenge facing current WTO decision-making-that of the difficulty of most developing countries to participate effectively in the WTO, whether in its political or judicial processes. Most developing countries are at a severe disadvantage on account of their relative lack of resources (both financial and human capital), their lower aggregate stakes in the trading system (even though they may have high relative stakes), and the increasingly complex and resource-demanding nature of the WTO system. The issue of absolute compared to relative stakes is the most important explanation for developing countries' inability to participate in proportion to their needs. Because of individual developing countries' relatively smaller value, volume and variety of exports, they obtain lower absolute benefits from participation in the WTO system. Their aggregate benefits are less likely to exceed the threshold of the cost of participation, especially in light of the uncertainty that they can realize the benefits desired. 6 Even so, many developing countries may have much higher relative The creation of a WTO parliamentary body should be judged in terms of its impact on the participation of developing countries and their constituents relative to the institutional alternatives.
That is: would a WTO parliamentary body further increase the costs of participation in WTO rulemaking, favoring wealthy, well-organized and well-connected parties with higher absolute stakes (i.e. U.S. and European multinational enterprises and issue-specific non-governmental organizations) over parties with lower absolute stakes (i.e. developing country constituents)? Or, would a WTO parliamentary body increase the relative understanding of the perspectives of developing countries and increase their impact in the shaping of WTO debates? These questions should be answered from a comparative institutional perspective. The impact of a WTO parliamentary body needs to be compared with the current alternative of organized global "civil society" non-governmental representatives advocating on the international stage. According to some analysts, these groups more likely consist of US and European nationals, financed by US and European constituents. In consequence, they predominantly could reflect US and European perspectives and priorities, even when criticizing certain US and EU governmental positions. 7 1. A Comparative Institutional Conceptual Framework. The core concept of contemporary democracy is to hold rulers accountable through elected representatives. 8 However, in a world of increasing numbers and complexity, it is impossible for representative institutions to address all matters having a social impact. In consequence, decision-making is delegated-whether formally or informally-to non-representative institutions, such as markets, bureaucracies, courts, quasi-public bodies, private companies, and public-private networks. We differentiate the concept of governance from that of government to assess decision-making mechanisms that are not directly accountable to a popularly elected political body of a constitutional democracy. Most scholarship addressing international institutions and regimes focuses on the concept of "global governance" because there is no popularly elected global "government." 9 The fact that global institutions are not subject to control through direct popular elections or referenda subjects them to frequent charges that they are "illegitimate" because they are not "democratic." The WTO, for example, is a frequent target of such challenges, in particular where WTO judicial bodies find that national legislation is inconsistent with WTO rules. Although there are legitimate normative concerns about the accountability of global institutions, critics, whether from the left or the right, also can manipulate arguments over "legitimacy" to advance their particular policy preferences.
The central normative concept for assessing the normative legitimacy of decision-making
should not be whether a decision has been rendered by a popularly-elected body. If that were the case, then no decision-making should be delegated to markets, bureaucracies, courts or any other body. Rather, the legitimacy of institutions should be viewed in a broader sense as concerning the relative accountability of decision-making processes to those affected by them. Governance mechanisms implicitly can be democratic, in this broader sense, to the extent that decision-makers (or decision-making processes) are held accountable to the public through accountability mechanisms. As Robert Keohane writes, accountability mechanisms can operate in multiple manners, which he characterizes as hierarchical, legal, market, reputational, fiscal, supervisory and participatory. Accountability mechanisms exist to sanction decision-makers when they fail to take account of affected interests.
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Comparative institutional analysis is a conceptual framework for assessing public policy in terms of the relatively unbiased participation of affected parties in alternative institutional settings.
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From a comparative institutional perspective, normative legitimacy depends on how well parties' diverse views and interests are taken into account in an institutional context (be it a political, judicial, market or other process) in comparison with alternative non-idealized institutional settings.
12 See Neil Walker, "The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key," in eds. In a world of large numbers and complexity, no institution provides for completely unbiased participation or representation of affected interests. All institutions are imperfect. Thus, single institutional critiques are necessary but insufficient.
National constitutions and global governance mechanisms conceptually have much in common in that they both address the allocation of decision-making authority to alternative institutions. The difference between national constitutional orders and (often inchoate) global governance mechanisms is one of degree and gradation along a spectrum.
12 Global governance mechanisms should not be judged, and simply dismissed, against some ideal type of national democratic constitution. Rather, global governance mechanisms should be assessed in terms of whether they allocate decision-making authority in a manner that permits for a relatively less-biased representation of affected parties compared to other institutional alternatives, whether these alternatives lie at the local, national or global level.
Global governance mechanisms help address conflicts over foreign and national values, priorities and interests. They thereby can allocate decision-making over conflicting goals to alternative institutions, playing roles conceptually similar to those of national constitutional orders.
In a globalizing world of complex interdependence, there is an increasing amount of policy initiatives and scholarship that addresses the need for such governance mechanisms. This scholarship ranges from assessments of the appropriateness of centralized global institutions (including parliaments), decentralized epistemic and transgovernmental regimes, civil society networks and cross-border social movements, often contrasting the respective roles of representative, deliberative and expertise-dominated processes. These alternatives need be assessed from a comparative institutional perspective.
There is nothing inherent that makes global governance mechanisms more or less representative of affected parties' competing views and interests than domestic processes. We live in a world of multiple constitutional orders whose disparate decision-making processes affect one another's constituents. On the one hand, government representatives cannot control for the impact 13 Of course, governmental representatives in powerful states retain relatively greater discretion and control over decision-making affecting their constituents than do those in weaker states. 14 Developing country government concerns, of course, vary. Some countries fear that the addition of a parliamentary dimension would add to their burden, exacerbating the disadvantages that they already face in WTO negotiations on account of resource asymmetries. The addition of a parliamentary dimension, they fear, would favor large countries with larger delegations. Other developing countries fear that adding a parliamentary dimension shifts the focus toward the WTO's "external transparency," away from their chief concern over the WTO's "internal transparency" toward developing country members. 57 Still other developing countries fear that their parliamentarians could undermine their negotiating positions, and they want to be sure that they can "control" the process. 58 Some fear that parliamentarians could defend vested protectionist interests, and possibly undermine a mutually beneficial trade deal.
Nonetheless, developing country governments also recognize that they could gain from the addition of some form of inter-parliamentarian interface at the WTO level. Many parliamentarians from developing countries favor the holding of parliamentary sessions involving the WTO precisely because it is difficult for them otherwise to obtain information about WTO developments. They find themselves being asked to ratify WTO agreements about which they know little until the deal is done. 59 Developing country governments, on the other hand, may find that parliamentarian attendance at WTO ministerial meetings could help them explain the difficulty of WTO negotiations in national capitals. 60 The holding of inter-parliamentary meetings on the WTO brings parliamentarians into closer contact with their national trade officials simply to prepare for these Creating a WTO parliamentary dimension would require many other decisions, including the funding of meetings; whether the IPU would operate as the coordinating entity or whether an independent network of legislators would be formed; how delegates would be selected (whether by national bodies, through self-selection subject to limits per WTO member, or otherwise); and how delegates would be apportioned among WTO members (whether taking account of population, participation in global trade or any other factor). As for the designation of parliamentarians, a system eventually could be institutionalized whereby parliamentarians would come from the trade committees of national/WTO member parliamentary bodies to whom they, in turn, would report. there is a chance that NGO oversight and pressure on the WTO will continue, while most parliamentarians' interest in WTO developments could wane.
A second rationale for holding inter-parliamentarian meetings is more controversial, in particular within the United States-that of fostering a global forum for cosmopolitics. Under this second rationale, parliamentarians should deliberate over the impact of WTO policies and national practices that affect each other's constituents. In an idealized world, were such deliberation to take place in a relatively unbiased manner, and were it to have an impact on domestic and global policymaking, the world arguably would be more democratic and harmonious. However, in practice, such an inter-parliamentary body would be beset by severe institutional imperfections. Its precise role and structure, were it to exist, thus needs to be subjected to comparative institutional analysis-that is, an analysis that compares the relative costs and benefits of institutionalizing this participatory mechanism compared to other institutional alternatives. At this stage, it appears preferable to tread lightly, organize annual meetings where parliamentarians can learn about the WTO, coordinate with their governmental representatives and interact with each other in an inchoate cosmopolitan process
